This paper questions the continued existence of prerogative as a meaningful juridical category within UK constitutional law. It constructs a concept of prerogative out of canonical definitions, themselves instructive but incomplete, at the core of which is the idea of prerogative as a special category of executive power that evokes a special authority to which other political agents ought to defer. In light of recent prerogative cases, the paper advances two possibilities. A moderate reading suggests that prerogative has now become a special category of executive power that may evoke a special authority to which the court may in appropriate cases defer. A stronger reading advances the idea that prerogative is no longer a special category, but rather an inchoate set of executive capacities to which deference in general terms ought not to be given. It concludes by suggesting that we need to update our conceptual vocabulary. Just as we now speak about the executive's general administrative powers of contract and agency, we should prefer the terminology of the general executive powers of government to the vocabulary of royal prerogative.
There are more important sources of political authority, but prerogative may still represent the apotheosis of executive power. Parliament has successfully chipped away at prerogative powers for centuries and the courts have done much to bring them further into the constitutional fold. Since there has been no wholesale abolition of prerogative, to suggest the end of prerogative may seem foolhardy in the extreme. But it is just this line of inquiry that this paper proposes. Prompted by a quartet of United Kingdom Supreme Court cases that question the extent to which prerogative can still be said to operate as prerogative, it pursues as a kind of thought-experiment the proposition that * Professor of Law, London School of Economic and Political Science. I would like to thank the participants at the workshop on executive power held in Perth at the Institute of Advanced Studies, The University of Western Australia in April 2017, particularly to Murray Wesson for organising the workshop and the Honourable Robert French AC for his comments on the original paper. I would also like to thank Robert Craig for his comments on a later draft.
what we are witnessing may not be the continued declension of prerogative so much as its incipient demise.
The more that argument succeeds, the more it diverges from previous analysis of the subject, including my own, which observed attempts by the courts in particular to normalise prerogative while noting the deference to government that still characterised prerogative cases. While the prerogative might be ordinary in principle, it remained special in practice. 1 What is apparent in the more recent jurisprudence is the almost complete absence of deference afforded to the category by the courts. So emptied, prerogative begins to look like any other executive power, especially since the national security terrain on which it often presents is increasingly subject to scrutiny by courts and other institutions on something close to ordinary principles. Indeed, pleading prerogative might even have the opposite effect from the one intended, putting the court more on guard than it otherwise might have been.
Far from being the trump card it may have been once, prerogative may now be something of a liability for those charged with defending governmental action.
There is value in pressing this case. But I also offer a fall-back position that accepts the continued existence of prerogative as a distinct, formal source of authority, but tries to make sense of it given the demystification that has occurred in respect of both the prerogative category itself and the substantive claims for special powers in the interests of salus populi with which it was once conjoined.
Either alternative rests on assumptions about public law method. To get the argument going, I put both on the table now. The first assumption is that conceptual analysis in public law cannot just be about legal doctrine. Public law concerns how state power is instituted and exercised. To study a public law concept requires an account not just of what judges and jurists have said about it, but also an account of how what they said fits within the broader juristic framework of constitutional politics. It involves questions of jurisdiction but
The second assumption is that this style of conceptual analysis tends to take the form of a conversation between the present and the past. Most public law argument is situated, adopting an internal point of view to its subject. It may be more or less normatively committed, but its concern is with this political community and the ragbag of institutions, processes and norms -or what passes for constitutional wisdom -that makes it what it is. This is not nativist dogma -one can adopt an internal point of view without necessarily being an insider or participant. 3 Nor does it devalue the contribution of comparative or more general philosophical inquiries, not least because these living traditions of thought and practice are not hermetically sealed and inspiration can be drawn from many sources. It is merely to observe the traditionality of much of what we do, our imbrication within juridical structures that 'involve the authoritative presence of transmitted, real or purported past'. 4 Other things being equal, public lawyers have a responsibility to cultivate the juristic tradition in which they operate. Their enterprise is a species of practical reason that entails the refraction of received juristic material in light of the concerns of the present.
I THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PREROGATIVE
I suspect I am not alone in finding the usual definitions of prerogative deficient. There must be something in them for us to go back to them so often. But the intuition developed in the first part of the paper is that each definition identifies an important aspect of prerogative but does not manage to capture the essence of the whole. I intend to sift through these conceptions in order to derive what I call a central case of prerogative, which I later hold up against current practice.
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This process of exposition, criticism and recovery -of disassembling key parts of the existing conceptual apparatus in order to reassemble them more satisfactorily -is somewhat stylised, and may entail drawing sharper contrasts between certain positions than a more orthodox textual treatment might allow.
When speaking about prerogative we tend to remark first on how difficult it is to pin down -'a term which has caused more perplexity to students than any other expression referring to the constitution', 6 Dicey wroteand on the incense-laden air of sanctity that surrounds it. 7 It is as if we feel compelled to undergo ritual obeisance at the threshold of Blackstone's altar of the bona dea 8 before moving on to questions of substance. We now perform this ritual self-consciously and semi-ironically, 9 a display of worldliness that only partially convinces, and I suspect that the numinous quality is part of the central case of prerogative.
Genuflection performed, our navigation of prerogative generally involves the interplay of three canonical statements or conceptions. These are more at variance with each other than we sometimes assume. In this game of competing definitions it is Dicey's that predominates. He describes prerogative as 'the remaining portion of the Crown's original authority' and therefore 'the name for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown, whether such power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers'. 10 While illuminating in certain respects, the definition is incomplete. For one thing, it does not distinguish prerogative from third- 26 Locke's account of the scope of this power is, to modern eyes, extraordinarily broad: 'the Executor of the Laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common Law of Nature, a right to make use of it, for the good of the Society, in many Cases, where the municipal Law has given no direction, till the Legislative can conveniently be Assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the Law can by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power in his hands, to be ordered by him, as the publick good and advantage shall require': Locke, above n 23, Second Treatise, ch XIV, s 159. 27 It is remarkable, if little noted, how close this aspect of Locke's theory mirrors a standard distinction in scholastic thought, derived from Roman Law, between imperium, the ruler's exceptional and ultimate authority, which was not subject to law; and iurisdictio, or the ruler's routine decisions, which remain subject to law. from the normal legal source (typically statute) or by engaging the process associated with that source (typically parliamentary debate and assent). The Prince derives this special power directly from his capacity as supreme executive agent, drawing on that wellspring of power as need arises in order to fulfil his obligation to secure the public interest (salus populi). Prerogative engages, that is to say, the Prince's capacity as guardian of the state -what Cicero called custodes patriae.
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The tendency among common lawyers like Hale had been to carve up and classify prerogative into a bundle of particular, bespoke prerogatives, a familiar strategy of disaggregation and normalization. 31 Locke's instincts ran in the opposite direction. He wanted to draw attention to what he took to be prerogative's juridically exceptional nature. Locke must have been aware that this approach entailed risks for his political project of patterning political association according to settled and standing laws structured on a fiduciary relationship between government and governed. His chapter on prerogative offers a reflection on the limits of that model. He assumes that there must be a space beyond the realm of settled and standing laws and that the products of that space must by definition take non-legal shape. 'Prerogative is nothing but the Power of doing publick good without a Rule.' 32 It exists in the realm of decision and action -echoes of Carl Schmitt are inescapable 33 -as opposed to deliberation and coordinated norm-production. Locke, enemy of the late Stuarts, 34 is naturally alert to prerogative's dangers. He develops a politicaltheological narrative of trial and judgement where the assertion of prerogative tests the bonds of trust between sovereign and subject. His radical status is confirmed by an embrace of the potential upside of such moments of conflictpregnant possibility that may produce disintegration but may equally lead to political and spiritual renewal. But Locke's key conceptual insight is that prerogative denotes a legally unstructured species of authority that is a necessary and prior condition of rule-bound civil association. The third conception derives from Blackstone, whose name has already cropped up in the company of those who highlight the symbolic or affective element of prerogative. That is appropriate, for it was not idly that contemporary critics called him 'prerogative lawyer', 35 and he set value on the Gothic dimensions of English law and politics. 36 But Blackstone also brings out a third element of prerogative. Consider this famous passage in the Commentaries, obliquely referenced earlier, where prerogative is described as:
[a] topic, that in some former ages was thought too delicate and sacred to be profaned by the pen of a subject. It was ranked among the arcana imperii; and, like the mysteries of the bona dea, was not suffered to be pried into by any but such as were initiated in its service; because perhaps the exertion of the one, like the solemnities of the other, would not bear the inspection of rational and sober inquiry.
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There is mocking, sardonic note to this, without question, 38 yet it still reinforces the now familiar idea of prerogative as tied to the dignity of the King, and his status as basileus or imperator. 39 But Blackstone relates another essential idea, and this is that prerogative is a special type of authority claim. The claim has two parts. First, a claim of special power that is a mark of sovereignty -and it is for that reason that prerogative is 'singular and eccentrical' 40 -but even so would not otherwise be within the sovereign agent's capacity to act. Second, a claim of special jurisdiction, that is, a power for the sovereign agent to determine whether that exercise of power is legitimate. 41 As Blackstone elaborated, 'in the exertion of lawful prerogative, the king is and ought to be It is tempting to see this definition as simply expressing in different language Locke's point about the essential juridical otherness of prerogative. True, there are connections between the two accounts, but whereas Locke's theory is primarily political -indeed it interrogates foundational questions of obligation, force and right -Blackstone's enquiry is essentially constitutional. Blackstone sees prerogative as the special preserve of constitutional grey areas. In as much as it is outside the remit of the ordinary law, it stays within the constitution. The prerogative claim revealed in the last paragraph remains a claim to intra-constitutional authority rather than extra-constitutional action. It operates with the cognizance of the legal constitution even if it neither derives its legitimacy entirely from that quarter, nor comes fully under its jurisdiction. For Blackstone, prerogative power comes nested within law and institutional structures more firmly and squarely than Locke's theory seems to allow. 'I shall not (I trust) be considered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when I lay it down as a principle, that in the execution of lawful prerogative, the king is and ought to be absolute'. 46 4. Prerogative, understood as a mode of peremptory authority, has corresponding analytic properties. It is affective in that the style of decisive leadership it sustains still draws, albeit sotto voce, upon an ideal of kingly rule. As a residual symbol of majesty and lordship, prerogative taps into a sentiment now barely glimpsed and almost shameful to modern constitutional sensibilities, but which is probably more alive than we care to admit. 55 It has a distinctive form in that it dispenses very largely with the formal requirements and processes that otherwise mark exercises of governmental power. And it has a distinctive function -as a claim to a special power and jurisdiction that represents a primary decisionistic element within the constitution. 5. In practice, these properties tend to operate as a complex whole. The weakening of one element can weaken the whole. In particular, as the 50 In an early work, Carl Schmitt draws a helpful distinction between measures or decrees, which are situation-specific and action-oriented, and legal norms, which aim to give expression to a legal principle and are thus general in scope, in discussing the powers of 
III THE PREROGATIVE TWO-STEP REVISITED
The first part of the paper identified a 'central case' of prerogative -that is, the strongest version of the concept consistent with existing constitutional fundamentals -by sifting through existing conceptions. In this second part, attention turns to practice. Where possible, the case is pressed that prerogative has ceased to function in a way that is consistent with its central case. But by concentrating on a number of recent United Kingdom Supreme Court cases this process of testing proceeds in a relatively limited way since a thorough appraisal would necessitate a full survey of not only all the relevant cases but also developments in other institutions, and these are only briefly recorded here.
With that qualification in mind, let us turn to the law. Contemporary judicial review principles relating to the prerogative date from the GCHQ case. 60 The case involved a challenge to the use of the prerogative by the Prime Minister, in her capacity as Minister for Civil Service, to ban workers at signal intelligence headquarters, GCHQ, from belonging to a trade union. The case stands for the proposition that in principle an exercise of prerogative power is reviewable on ordinary public law grounds. 61 In Lord Diplock's words: 'I see no reason why simply because a decision-making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory source, it should for that reason only be immune from judicial review.' 62 But in fact what the case gives with one hand it all but takes back with the other, such were the riders and qualifications added to the principle. Many prerogatives, the Law Lords agreed, were beyond the reach of the judicial process altogether because review of their exercise would necessarily involve policy considerations. The best-known exclusionary device was Lord Roskill's list of 'excluded categories', that is, those prerogatives that were judged by their nature to be unreviewable. The non-exhaustive list 60 The previous modern jurisprudence held that the courts would inquire into whether a particular prerogative exists or not, and if it does exist, into its extent. But once the existence and extent of a power are established, the court cannot inquire into the propriety of its exercise: Attorney A review the post-GCHQ case law a decade ago produced a mixed picture. Judicial oversight might have gone further than earlier dicta would have led one to expect; but there was still plenty of deference to prerogative on show.
65 I argued that while there had been a genuine movement in a rule-of-law direction, you more often saw the courts performing a 'prerogative two-step'.
Step 1 the refusal to countenance the idea of a gap in the normal framework of the law and the assertion that ordinary legal principles apply to prerogative lawmaking;
Step 2, the accommodation of government interests and equivocation or uncertainty in the application of those principles. In other words, courts were disinclined to say that a challenge to a prerogative non-justiciable, but were reluctant to decide against the government. Looking back, this was true of GCHQ itself. The House of Lords held that the exercise of prerogative was in principle reviewable -employees and trade unionists had a legitimate expectation of consultation -but that national security interests as defined by government took precedence. The government lost on the law, so to speak, but still managed to win at the close.
Many prerogative cases seemed to fit this mould. GCHQ had made inroads into prerogative but had left its basic structure for the most part intact. More specifically, at one level (corresponding to Step 1) the jurisprudence claimed to demystify and normalise prerogative, purporting to treat it as just another executive power (albeit one that in some contexts touched upon matters of political sensitivity). At another level (corresponding to Step 2), it accepted, often covertly or at least quietly, the continued existence of 63 Ibid 418. 64 prerogative as a special category of executive power that evoked a special authority to which the court ought to defer. In the application of the law of prerogative then, there was some evidence to suggest the residual pull of the affective dimension of prerogative which, though now denied at the level of general principle, had been so long one of its core elements.
This jurisprudential analysis sat within a broader account of constitutional dynamics that contained two key aspects, both with considerable pedigree: the shrinking of prerogative, taking place largely at the political level but not only there, 66 typically by turning prerogative into a statutory power; 67 and the normalising of prerogative that occurs largely at the legal level but not only there, typically by subjecting the exercise of prerogative to more searching scrutiny. 68 What I did not foresee was the pace of change. Examples of shrinkage include putting the right to manage the civil service, at issue in GCHQ, on a statutory footing, 69 ultimately this normalising process would reduce the category to its hard core. But more recent jurisprudential developments question that analysis and make it possible to advance a stronger explanatory narrative. They make it plausible to argue, that is to say, that prerogative has no discernible core.
Exemplary in this regard are four cases handed down in the same week by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ('UKSC'), all of which touched on foreign relations powers. In Miller -the Brexit case -the UKSC upheld the lower court's decision that the government did not have the power under the foreign relations prerogative to give notice to the European Union institutions of the United Kingdom's intention to withdraw from the European Union, since to do so would compromise existing statutory rights. 72 Much has already been said about the case. 73 But what is interesting for present purposes is thatcontrary to the expectations of many commentators, even those like me who thought that the government should lose on the law -neither court gave any leeway to the argument based on the affective dimension of prerogative, prominent though it was in government submissions. This represents a significant defeat for prerogative since this was a case decided on one of its strongest grounds -foreign relations being unquestionably part of its central case 74 -and at the sharp end of governmental action. One of the government's documents claimed that the matter was 'of high, if not the highest, policy; a polycentric decision based upon a multitude of domestic and foreign policy and political concerns for which the expertise of Ministers and their officials are particularly well suited and the Courts ill-suited.' 75 In response, the UKSC repeated Lord Reid's description of prerogative as 'a relic of a past age', 76 while being careful not to deny its functional importance as a ministerial power in the fields of diplomacy and war. 77 The Court was not remotely persuaded that the category in itself did any work, holding with clarity and conviction that the functional concerns that might be said to support it must be subordinated to the constitutional arguments arraigned against it here. 78 The judges denied the claim that the prerogative as a category reflects or embodies the custodial function of the executive in relation to which courts should tread warily, an argument that did have some traction among the dissenting judges.
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The other three cases, handed down together -Belhaj, Rahmatullah and Serdar Mohamed -are less well known but in their own way equally significant. They arise out of the post-2001 counterterrorism climate and target specifically the United Kingdom's complicity in the unlawful detention and rendition, assault, torture and cruel and inhuman treatment of individuals usually (in these actions) at the hands of officials of other states. In narrowly doctrinal terms, they engage the category of Act of State, a common law doctrine (or set of doctrines) that shelters from judicial oversight certain kinds of 'sovereign' acts done in the exercise of the foreign relations prerogative and the broadly comparable acts of other states. 80 Constitutionally speaking, we might invoke
Locke to suggest that those doctrines are part of the federative power and, as such, may be conceived if not as part of the prerogative then operating on precisely the same terrain, since both rest in the same hands (the executive) and derive their authority from the same source (its capacity as guardian of the state). This perspective acknowledges that Act of State is part of domestic law not public international law. It also tells us something useful about the legal terrain that Act of State is supposed to help map out. In these terms, Act of State can be understood as a principle (or set of principles) that is partly constitutive of that part of the state that comprehends and acts in the world outside it. As the term federative implies -it is centrally about agreements or pacts (foedera) -this capacity also has a non-domestic dimension. That is, it also patterns legal relations that result principally from the actions of other state agents but which touch on the legal capacities of the state's own agents. It does so federatively -that is, as though it expects those patterns to be mirrored 78 Ibid [92] . 79 R (Miller) Lord Neuberger P seems to attract the most support, although Lord Mance SCJ's is arguably the leading judgment. What is clear is that the Court rejected the contention that United Kingdom courts were precluded 'from investigating any acts of a foreign state when and if the Foreign Office communicated the Government's view that such investigation would "embarrass" the United Kingdom in its international relations'. 84 (Although such a statement might be a factor a court would take into account when deciding whether to refuse to determine the issue.
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) That position came with a wider rejection of the straightforward equation between the exercise of sovereignty and the executive branch of the state, not just in the United Kingdom but more widely:
In states subject to the rule of law, a state's sovereignty may be manifest through its legislative, executive or judicial branches acting within their respective spheres … A rule of recognition which treats any executive act by the government of a foreign state as valid, irrespective of its legality under the law of the foreign state … could mean ignoring, rather than giving effect to, the way in which a state's sovereignty is expressed.
86
This is an important statement. It insists that the starting proposition within a constitutional state such as the United Kingdom must be that federative power is exercised on the basis of legality (or constitutionality) and not on the basis of prerogative (or sovereignty). This proposition only has direct bearing on United Kingdom law, of course, but as I said earlier it is a characteristic of the federative that it operates on the assumption that other similar legal orders will mirror or replicate the legal structure of the federative that is being articulated here. This statement does from the outside -and rather more boldlysomething that Miller does from within. It dismantles the worldview that sustains the domestic prerogative in a strong sense, that is, the prerogative understood as an imperative and directive constitutional power. That view of the prerogative, when externalized and generalized, fits a model in which sovereign entities interact on the basis of their presumed imperative authority. Instead, the UKSC in Belhaj insists upon a standard for the United Kingdom's interaction with other legal orders that corresponds to the United Kingdom constitution's own principles.
The second Act of State case, Al-Waheed, concerned an action for damages against the United Kingdom government this time alleging unlawful detention and maltreatment by British forces. 87 The first question concerned whether the United Kingdom had authority under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions to adopt its own detention policy, above and beyond that already established in Afghanistan under the aegis of the International Security Assistance Force. The Court held that it did. 88 A second issue related to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR') to extraterritorial armed conflict. On this matter, the majority preferred the decision of the Grand Chamber in Hassan v United Kingdom over its earlier judgment in Al-Skeini. 89 In Hassan, the European Court of Human Rights rejected the argument that Article 5 (the right to liberty) was displaced in such contexts, but held that it fell to be adapted to a context in which international humanitarian law provided the relevant safeguards against abuse. 90 Applied to the situation in Al-Waheed, the UKSC found the detention processes deficient on the narrow basis that it failed to provide an adequate and practical means by which those detained could challenge the legality of their detention. 91 The United Kingdom was therefore in breach of its obligations under ECHR Article 5(4).
There is considerable nuance here, as the UKSC tried to grapple with what is an almost intractable predicament. The relevant context is where, pursuant to the exercise of armed force, a signatory to the ECHR has gained some foothold, necessarily incomplete, within a foreign territory. In that context, it is likely to be impossible to guarantee the whole gamut of Convention rights. Does that mean that the only alternative is in effect the disapplication of those rights? Either option has considerable drawbacks. In line with the consistent disinclination in these cases to allow for legal black holes, 92 the Court preferred an approach that insisted that a core set of rights must apply in extra-territorial conflicts and -equally important -that those rights are made meaningful to those who seek to engage them. 93 The case was decided largely within the framework of European and international human rights law. 94 Even so, Al-Waheed manages to exemplify what now seems normal when it comes to judging activities within the prerogative/federative zone, where the urge to normalise and juridify is paramount and yet there is still sensitivity in the application of the (new) legal standards to often difficult operational contexts.
The third case, Serdar Mohamed, concerned extensive periods of detention of those initially captured by British forces in Iraq before being handed over to the United States. 95 This part of the action related to the United Kingdom's own treatment of those detained, as opposed to its complicity with other states that was the issue in Belhaj, and so engaged the Crown (or domestic) Act of State doctrine. Building on admittedly 'shaky foundations', 96 Lady Hale DP in the leading judgment acknowledged the existence of a 'rule that certain decisions of high policy in the conduct of foreign affairs are nonjusticiable'. 97 She continued, applying the rule to the context before her: 'if act of state is a defence to the use of lethal force in the conduct of military operations abroad, it must also be a defence to the capture and detention of persons on imperative grounds of security in the conduct of such operations. It makes no sense to permit killing but not capture and detention, the military then being left with the invidious choice between killing the enemy or letting him go.'
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So far so prerogative-minded, one might say. 'It is necessary that the courts continue to recognise that there are some acts of a governmental nature, committed abroad, upon which the courts in England and Wales will not pass judgment.' 99 But there is a sting in the tail. Emphasising the need to keep domestic act of state within very narrow bounds, 100 Lady Hale DP concluded:
prerogative has now become a special category of executive power that may evoke a special authority to which the court may in appropriate cases defer.
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The stronger reading presses the point further so that redefinition becomes deconstruction: prerogative is no special category, just an inchoate set of executive capacities to which deference in general terms ought not to be given.
It may not matter all that much whether the moderate or the stronger interpretation of the prerogative is right. But one difference between them may be that if the courts elect the stronger position over the more moderate one, the harder it is going to be for the executive to get traction in prerogative cases. The reason is simple. Whereas the moderate reading still permits deference, the stronger reading makes deference exceptional and marginal. Underlying this is a minor, but significant difference. The stronger reading presses more vigorously what we might call the claims of constitutional normality. It insists with fewer reservations than the alternative that any special authority claimed by the executive ought to be sourced through more legitimate forms of legal authority -statute principally, 104 but also in the federative context (positive) international law. 105 Either way, it may be time to stop talking about prerogative altogether. The term obscures more than it elucidates -but then again it has done that for a long time. We should update our legal categories to match our constitutional thinking. Just as we now speak about the executive's general administrative powers as opposed to prerogatives of contract and agency, so too should we ditch prerogative and talk instead about the general executive powers of government. 
